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According to a traditional view, reality is singular. Socrates andPlato are philosophers; each of them has the property of being
a philosopher.1 Being a philosopher is a singular property in that it is
instantiated separately by Socrates and by Plato. The property of being
a philosopher, like the property of being human, has the higher-order
property of being instantiated. The property of being instantiated is
singular too. It is instantiated separately by the property of being a
philosopher and by the property of being human. If we generalize
these ideas, we obtain what may be called the singular conception of
reality. This is the view that reality encompasses entities belonging to
two main categories: objects and singular properties of various orders.2
The singular conception of reality offers a simple picture of what
there is, and it offers a simple picture of the semantics of singular pred-
ication. A basic predication of the form S(t), composed of a singular
term t and a singular predicate S, is true in a given interpretation of
the language if and only if, relative to that interpretation, the object
denoted by t instantiates the property denoted by S.
A broader conception of reality, however, has been advocated. The
Romans conquered Gaul. This is not something that any Roman did
separately. They conquered Gaul jointly. According to advocates of the
broader conception of reality, conquering Gaul is a plural property, one
that is instantiated jointly by the Romans. This broader conception of
reality, which admits the existence of plural properties in addition to
singular ones, has been called the plural conception of reality (Yi 2006).
An attractive feature of the plural conception of reality is that it
offers a straightforward way of handling the semantics of plural pred-
ication. Consider an atomic formula, P(tt), composed of a plural term
tt and a plural predicate P. If plural properties are available, one may
hold that P(tt) is true in a given interpretation of the language if and
1. Those who prefer to understand predication in terms of Fregean concepts
should have no difficulty in translating claims about properties into claims
about concepts throughout the article.
2. I use ‘entity’ as an umbrella term covering both objects and properties, and
I take ‘object’ to mean the same as ‘individual’.
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only if, relative to that interpretation, the things denoted by tt jointly
instantiate the plural property denoted by P.
Without invoking plural properties it is far from clear how one
should account for plural predication. Does the singular conception
have the resources to provide a satisfactory semantics for plurals? This
is the semantic challenge to the singular conception. The apparent ab-
sence of a plausible response to the semantic challenge provides an
indispensability argument for the plural conception, and it has led var-
ious authors to introduce plural properties for semantic purposes (Yi
1999, 2002, 2005, 2006; Oliver and Smiley 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2013;
and McKay 2006).
In this article, I argue that this semantic challenge to the singular
conception can in fact be met. It follows that the adoption of the plu-
ral conception on semantic grounds alone cannot be justified. I outline
an approach to the semantics of plurals which dispenses with plural
properties, and I show that it fares as well as the best approach based
on the plural conception. On this approach, plural terms denote sin-
gular properties and plural predicates denote singular higher-order
properties. This is reminiscent of existing proposals that make use of
higher-order resources to account for the semantics of plurals (see Rus-
sell 1919, 1938; Higginbotham and Schein 1989; Dummett 1991; and
Lønning 1997). Despite some point of contact, however, there is a cru-
cial difference between such proposals and the one to which I want to
draw attention. To bring this difference to light I will have to take a
fresh look at the semantic debate about plurals. I will clarify what is
at stake between competing accounts and, on the basis of important
distinctions that have been overlooked, I will provide a more accurate
characterization of the territory than it is usually given. This will help
elucidate the nature of the semantic challenge and open up the space
for an adequate semantics of plurals which lives completely inside the
singular conception.
To forestall possible misunderstandings, I should make two prelim-
inary remarks. First, my focus is on model-theoretic semantics rather
than the theory of truth. This is because it is doubtful that proper-
ties need to be invoked at all in the formal definition of truth for the
language with which we are concerned (see Boolos 1984, Rayo and
Uzquiano 1999, and Rayo 2006). Since there is no need to vary the in-
terpretation of the predicates to define truth for that language, there is
no need to regard predicates as denoting expressions. Thus the theory
of truth has no obvious bearing on the semantic challenge and on the
indispensability argument for the plural conception.
Second, my contention is that plural properties are not semantically
indispensable, and thus the semantic argument in favor of plural prop-
erties fails. To secure this claim it is enough to show that there is a
semantic account of plurals that satisfies the following desiderata: (a)
it can be fully developed within the singular conception of reality, (b)
it is semantically equivalent to the best account based on the plural con-
ception, and (c) it is in good standing. Showing that such an account
is preferable to the best account based on the plural conception is an
additional task. But it is strictly more than we need to undermine the
indispensability argument, and it will not be taken up here. Instead, I
will argue for the more modest but still significant claim that the novel
account is equivalent to the best account based on the plural concep-
tion.
1. Objections to singularism
A simple but problematic answer to the semantic challenge to the sin-
gular conception relies on the following view.
Regimentation Singularism
Plural terms and predicates are not required for the regimenta-
tion of natural language into a formal language. Singular terms
and predicates suffice.
Regimentation Singularism is a clear ally of the singular conception.
The regimentation singularist contends that plural constructions can
be rendered by paraphrase in a regimenting language containing only
singular expressions, and of course a semantics for such a language
can be given within the singular conception. The task facing the regi-
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mentation singularist is to provide a good method of paraphrase.
Two methods suggest themselves. According to the first, plural ex-
pressions can be paraphrased by means of set-theoretic expressions
(Quine 1982 and Resnik 1988). According to the second, plural expres-
sions can be paraphrased by means of mereological expressions (see
Massey 1976 and Link 1983). There are familiar objections to both meth-
ods. The main one is that they yield implausible entailment relations.
For instance, on both approaches a sentence such as (1) would logically
entail (2).
(1) Russell and Whitehead cooperate.
(2) There is a set or there is a mereological sum.
A number of additional arguments have been marshaled against
these construals of Regimentation Singularism. Consider the follow-
ing sentence:
(3) There are some sets such that any set is one of them if and only if
it is not self-membered.
It expresses a set-theoretic truth. The set-theoretic version of Regimen-
tation Singularism seems bound to paraphrase (3) as (4).
(4) There is a set x such that, for any set y, y is in x if and only if y is
not self-membered.
However, (4) is inconsistent. Thus a set-theoretic truth such as (3)
is regimented by a logically false sentence (Boolos 1984, Lewis 1991,
Higginbotham 1998, Schein 1993, Oliver and Smiley 2001).
For the mereological singularist, the natural rendering of a plural
term tt is ‘the sum of tt’. For instance, ‘Russell and Whitehead’ would
be paraphrased as ‘the sum of Russell and Whitehead’. 3
Now, (5) appears to be a mereologically true claim:
3. Since plurals must be completely eliminated in the paraphrase, ‘the sum of
Russell and Whitehead’, which is only partially singular, should be taken to
(5) The sum of Russell and Whitehead is identical to the sum of the
molecules of Russell and Whitehead.
But (5) commits the mereological singularist to (7) on the basis of (6)
(Oliver and Smiley 2001, p. 293).
(6) Russell and Whitehead were logicians.
(7) The molecules of Russell and Whitehead were logicians.
A similar argument has been put forth by Rayo (2002). Imagine that
we have some sand and that the grains of sand are grouped into piles.
There is a possible scenario in which both of the following sentences
are true.
(8) The piles of sand are scattered.
(9) The grains of sand are not scattered.4
Since the piles of sand form the same mereological sum as the grains
of sand, (10) holds.
(10) The sum of the piles of sand is the sum of the grains of sand.
Given (10), the mereological singularist must implausibly regard (8)
and (9) as contradictory.
Schein (1993) has pointed out that, almost ironically, the mereologi-
cal version of Regimentation Singularism gets the mereological facts
wrong. Define an atom to be an individual that does not have proper
parts. The expression ‘the atoms’ is paraphrased by ‘the sum of the
atoms’. Likewise, ‘the sums of atoms’ is paraphrased by ‘the sum of
the sums of atoms’. Whatever the domain, the sum of the atoms is
stand for a fully singular expression defining the relevant notion of sum, e.g.
‘the object x such that anything overlaps x if and only if it overlaps Russell
or it overlaps Whitehead’. For the sake of exposition, the arguments in the
remainder of this section are formulated using partially singular paraphrases.
4. The scenario envisioned is one in which the grains of sand are nicely
grouped into piles—hence they are not scattered—while the piles themselves
are scattered.
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identical to the sum of the sums of atoms, as they are both the sum of
everything in the domain. So, from (11), the mereological singularist is
forced to conclude (12).
(11) The atoms are exactly two.
(12) The sums of atoms are exactly two.
We know that, if there are n atoms, the number of mereological sums
over them is 2n − 1. Therefore, if the number of atoms is two, there are
three sums of atoms, which is inconsistent with (12). (For a discussion
of the prospects of the mereological approach, see Nicolas unpublished.
For a large-scale defense of it, see Link 1998.)
The arguments just reviewed target Regimentation Singularism.
As a result, Regimentation Pluralism has now become prominent.
Regimentation Pluralism
Plural terms and predicates are required in the regimentation of
natural language into a formal language.
It is important to notice, however, that appealing to Regimentation
Singularism is just one way in which the proponent of the singular
conception can attempt to address the semantic challenge. The singular
conception does not fall with Regimentation Singularism. Indeed,
Regimentation Pluralism is compatible with what may be called
Semantic Singularism.
Semantic Singularism
Once a regimenting language for plurals has been chosen, se-
mantic interpretations can be specified adequately within the
singular conception of reality.
The focus has now shifted from the level of regimentation to the level
of semantics. The crucial point is that the semantic singularist may
employ plural expressions in the regimenting language and does not
have to regard plural predication as singular predication in disguise.
Yet at the semantic level he will draw exclusively on singular resources,
characterizing the interpretations of the regimenting language within
the boundaries of the singular conception. The semantic challenge can
be met if there is a tenable version of Semantic Singularism. In the
remainder of this article, I address the semantic challenge and show
that there is a viable version of Semantic Singularism.
Those who advocate the plural conception of reality on semantic
grounds reject Semantic Singularism in favor of Semantic Plural-
ism.
Semantic Pluralism
Specifying semantic interpretations for plural sentences requires
the resources made available by the plural conception of reality.
Before turning to the semantic dispute between singularists and plu-
ralists, I will briefly introduce a basic regimenting language for plurals
in the spirit of Regimentation Pluralism. This will be the object lan-
guage of the competing semantic accounts that will occupy us from
section 4 onwards. By adopting it, we are leaving Regimentation Sin-
gularism and its problems behind.
2. Regimenting plurals
As is customary in the philosophical literature, the regimenting lan-
guage will be an extension of first-order logic that includes symbols for
plural predicates (e.g. ‘cooperate’, ‘are infinite’, ‘gather’), plural vari-
ables and quantifiers, and a distinguished relational symbol for plural
membership (‘being one of’, ‘being among’), which will be treated as
logical. This will be a version of the language known as PFO+ (see
Rayo 2002 and Linnebo 2003.)
We may take a predicate to have a fixed number of arguments, each
of which can be exclusively singular or exclusively plural. An argu-
ment place is singular if it is occupied by singular terms, i.e. singular
constants and singular variables. It is plural if it is occupied by plural
variables. A predicate is said to be plural if at least one of its argument
places is plural.
More specifically, the vocabulary of our language is composed by
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the usual vocabulary of first-order logic plus the following symbols.
A. Plural variables: vv and vvi for each i ∈ ω; double variables xx,
yy, zz will be used as plural variables in the metalanguage. Plural
proper names as well: aa, bb, cc, dd,. . .
B. Plural existential and universal quantifiers (∃, ∀) binding plural vari-
ables: ∃vv, ∀vv, ∃vv0,. . .
C. Symbols for collective plural predicates of any finite arity, with or
without numerical subscripts: A, B, C, . . . , A1, A2, . . . . For any ar-
ity n, it is convenient to allow only predicate symbols whose first
m argument places (1 ≤ m ≤ n) are plural and whose remain-
ing n− m argument places are singular. A superscript enclosed in
square brackets will indicate the number of plural arguments. The
arity of the predicate, when marked, will precede the square brack-
ets. For example, if W2[1] represents the two-place predicate ‘wrote
together’, the sentence ‘they wrote Principia Mathematica together’
may be represented as W2[1](vv, p). For the sake of readability, I
will often depart from this convention and allow the order of the
terms to reflect the order found in English.
D. A distinguished binary predicate ≺ for plural membership, taking
as arguments a singular term and a plural variable.
The recursive clauses defining a well-formed formula are the obvious
ones.
A central semantic phenomenon concerning plurals is the distinc-
tion between distributive and collective predicates.
Let Φ be a plural predicate (e.g. ‘are philosophers’) and let ϕ be its
corresponding singular form, if it exists (e.g. ‘is a philosopher’). Let us
say that Φ is distributive if
(13) Analytically, for any things xx, Φ(xx) if and only if, for any y that
is one of xx, ϕ(y).
A plural predicate will be said to be collective if it is not distributive. For
polyadic predicates the characterization is relativized to an argument
place.5
In the regimenting language just introduced, we can obtain the
force of distributive predication without employing distributive predi-
cates. Consider this sentence:
(14) Socrates and Plato are philosophers.
The use of the distributive ‘are philosophers’ can be paraphrased away
via the singular ‘is a philosopher’ as shown in (15).
(15) Everything that is one of Socrates and Plato is a philosopher.
For simplicity, we can then expunge distributive predicates from the
regimenting language.
The existence of a good method of paraphrase also makes the in-
troduction of a symbol for phrasal conjunction unnecessary. This is
shown by the following pair of sentences.
(16) Russell and Whitehead cooperate.
(17) There are some things such that Russell is one of them, Whitehead
is one of them, no other thing is one of them, and they cooperate.
Finally, some additional concepts do not require a separate treat-
ment but can be introduced as abbreviations. The plural ‘are among’,
symbolized by 4, is defined as follows.
(18) vv1 4 vv2 ↔de f ∀v (v ≺ vv1 → v ≺ vv2)
Plural identity, symbolized by ≈, is also definable.
(19) vv1 ≈ vv2 ↔de f (vv1 4 vv2 ∧ vv2 4 vv1)
This completes the presentation of the regimenting language.
As described, the language draws a rigid distinction between singu-
lar and plural argument places: an argument place is either exclusively
5. For further discussion of the distinction between distributive and collective
predicates, see Oliver and Smiley 2013, pp. 112-18, which includes an alterna-
tive formulation of the distinction.
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singular or exclusively plural. The significance of this distinction may
be doubted. First, the regimentation pluralist might adopt a regiment-
ing language containing only plural variables and recapture singular
talk through it. By taking ‘are among’ as a primitive relation, singu-
lar variables can be paraphrased in terms of special kinds of plural
variables (see Rayo 2002 and McKay 2006). Second, it might be ob-
jected that a rigid distinction does not do justice to the flexibility of
predication in natural language. Although some predicates can only
be combined grammatically with plural terms (e.g. ‘cooperating with
one another’, ‘gathering’, ‘overlapping’), other predicates—which we
call flexible—can be combined grammatically with both singular and
plural terms (e.g. ‘writing Principia Mathematica’ or ‘owning a house’).
The semantic implications of this phenomenon are debatable. One
might hold that these predicates do not occur univocally when com-
bined with different types of terms, perhaps emphasizing that they
can be glossed differently (‘writing together’ vs. ‘writing alone’, ‘own-
ing together’ vs. ‘owning alone’). In contrast, one might favor the view
that the predicates do occur univocally and the regimenting language
should be augmented with flexible predicates (see, e.g., Yi 2005, Oliver
and Smiley 2013). Some arguments in favor of flexible predicates will
be mentioned in section 5. However, I will not attempt to adjudicate
this dispute here. As I will note later, my main conclusion is indepen-
dent of it.6
Clearly, a regimenting language of this sort sides with Regimen-
6. It might be worth commenting on two additional features of this regiment-
ing language. First, for expositional economy plural constants have been left
out. Second, operators for definite descriptions have also been left out, but for
a different reason. Providing an adequate semantics for plural definite descrip-
tions presents distinctive difficulties and goes beyond the scope of this article.
In one case below (‘the authors of Principia Mathematica’), it will be convenient
to assume that a Russellian analysis of the plural description is acceptable.
Given that complex plural terms formed by conjoining singular constants are
paraphrased away, the only plural terms contained in the language are plural
variables. This parsimony, however, is not pointless. It will expedite the formu-
lation of the semantics in the Appendix. Nothing important for our purposes
hinges on these features of the regimenting language.
tation Pluralism. However, as I pointed out above, Regimentation
Pluralism does not mandate any particular semantic account of plu-
rals and is compatible with Semantic Singularism.
Now that we have settled on a basic regimenting language, we can
enter the semantic debate, explore the options, and decide whether any
version of Semantic Singularism is tenable.
3. Semantic approaches to plurals
Semantic singularists and semantic pluralists can agree on the general
characterization of the central notion of truth relative to an interpre-
tation for the common object language. If they admit properties in
their ontology—and this is the case in which we are interested—they
will hold that an atomic predication is true in a given interpretation if
and only if, relative to that interpretation, the property denoted by the
predicate is instantiated by whatever is denoted by the subject term.7
Semantic singularists and semantic pluralists can also agree on the
specific characterization of truth relative to an interpretation for singu-
lar predication, since they can agree that a singular term denotes an
object and a singular predicate denotes a singular property. Their dis-
agreement lies in how to specify the denotations of plural terms, which
in turn constrains what kind of properties can serve as denotations of
plural predicates. As we will see in a moment, there is also some in-
ternal disagreement among semantic singularists and among semantic
pluralists. Let us start by introducing the main views.
Competing semantics of plurals may be classified along two dimen-
sions. The first dimension concerns how many entities are taken to be
denoted by a plural term. In particular, does a plural term denote one
or many entities? The second dimension of classification concerns what
sort of entities are taken to be denoted by a plural term. In particular,
7. For simplicity, I am focusing here on monadic predication. The general case
is addressed in section 4 and in the Appendix.
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are the denotations of plural terms objects or properties? These possi-
bilities give rise to four views: object singularism, property singularism,
object pluralism, and property pluralism.
How many entities What sort of entities
are denoted by are denoted by
a plural term? a plural term?
object singularism one object
property singularism one property
object pluralism many objects
property pluralism many properties
The last view appears to be the least attractive, since it combines con-
troversial aspects of the other views without offering any advantage
over them. So we may take object pluralism to be the only pluralist
option and use ‘pluralism’ to mean ‘object pluralism’.
Once the semantic values of plural terms have been determined,
one must decide what kind of semantic value should be assigned to
plural predicates. There are obvious choices in the singularist camp.
On the one hand, the object singularist holds that a plural term denotes
an object and will therefore take a plural predicate to denote a singular
property of objects. On the other hand, the property singularist holds
that a plural term denotes a singular property and will therefore take
a plural predicate to denote a singular property of properties.
In the pluralist camp, there are three main views. According to
the first, which may be called untyped pluralism, plural predicates de-
note plural properties construed as objects, which means that no type
distinction between objects and properties is assumed (Hossack 2000
and McKay 2006). An alternative view adopted by Yi (1999, 2002, 2005,
2006) and Oliver and Smiley (2004, 2005, 2006, 2013) also takes plural
predicates to denote plural properties, but it construes them as typed.
That is, properties are now thought of as predicable entities rather
than objects. To highlight the contrast with the first view, let us call
this approach typed pluralism. Lastly, plural predicates have been taken
to denote ‘superpluralities’, i.e. many pluralities at once (Rayo 2006).
Call this approach superpluralism. The chart below displays the options
in the pluralist camp.
What do plural predicates denote?
untyped pluralism untyped properties
typed pluralism typed properties
superpluralism superpluralities
Since properties play no role in superpluralism, this view falls out-
side the main focus of this article, which is the dispute between defend-
ers of the singular conception and advocates of the plural conception.
Therefore superpluralism will be put aside here. In the remainder of
this section, I will discuss some arguments that will help us narrow
down our pool of candidates to two views: property singularism and
typed pluralism. In the next two sections, I will compare these two
views and argue that property singularism provides a satisfactory an-
swer to the semantic challenge.
Is object singularism a satisfactory option? On the most natural con-
strual of the view, plural terms denote (and plural quantifiers range
over) non-empty sets of objects in the range of the first-order quan-
tifiers. Accordingly, the predicate ‘being one of’ is interpreted as set-
theoretic membership. The assumption that the sets denoted by a plu-
ral term are non-empty is needed to render sentences like the following
logically false.8
8. By ruling out singletons we could satisfy the further requirement that ‘there
are some things such that exactly one thing is among them’ be logically false as
well. However, this additional requirement has been thought to be misguided
and will not be imposed here (see Yi 2005).
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(20) There are some things such that nothing is among them.
It is important to note that object singularism avoids the objections to
Regimentation Singularism discussed in section 1. Despite the fact
that in any interpretation of the language the term ‘Russell and White-
head’ denotes a set, the inference from ‘Russell and Whitehead cooper-
ate’ to ‘there is a set’ is blocked. The semantics provides a simple model
in which the first sentence is true while the second is false.9 Moreover,
since the object singularist embraces Regimentation Pluralism, she
can do justice to the problematic sentence (3) by regimenting it as (3∗)
rather than (3∗∗).
(3) There are some sets such that any set is one of them if and only if
it is not self-membered.
(3∗) ∃vv (S(vv) ∧ ∀v (S(v) → (v ≺ vv ↔ v /∈ v)))
(3∗∗) ∃v0 (S(v0) ∧ ∀v1 (S(v1) → (v1 ∈ v0 ↔ v1 /∈ v1)))
However, Regimentation Singularism forces the domain of quan-
tification to be set-sized. Sentence (21) follows logically from plural
comprehension applied to the formula v = v.10
(21) ∃vv ∀v v ≺ vv
If plural terms denote non-empty sets of objects in the range of the first-
order quantifiers, plural quantifiers must be taken to range over such
sets. Thus the logical truth of (21) amounts to the requirement that
9. Consider, for instance, an interpretation in which (a) the extensions of the
predicate ‘is a set’ is empty, (b) ‘Russell’ denotes r, (c) ‘Whitehead’ denotes w,
and (d) ‘cooperate’ denotes a singular property C that is instantiated by the set
{r, w}. Since {r, w} instantiates C, ‘Russell and Whitehead cooperate’ is true in
this interpretation, whereas ‘there is a set’ is false (the extension of ‘is a set’ is
assumed to be empty).
10. The regimented version of plural comprehension is the closure of the
schema (PC).
(PC) ∃v ϕ(v) → ∃vv ∀v (v ≺ vv↔ ϕ(v))
the things in the domain of the first-order quantifiers form a set. In
the absence of a universal set, the first-order domain of quantification
cannot be absolutely unrestricted. In particular, it cannot contain every
set.
There is something prima facie unsettling about this situation. A sen-
tence like (3) is intended to talk about every set there is, not just those
contained in some appropriately large set. Object singularism cannot
capture models where the domain encompasses every set. The object
singularist could resort to classes to provide a domain for such models.
But then the same difficulty would arise for another sentence.
(22) There are some classes such that any class is one of them if and
only if it is not self-membered.
An appeal to super–classes or some other type of higher-level collec-
tions would only delay the problem. Here is how Lewis (1991, p. 68)
puts it.
Whatever class-like things there may be altogether, holding none
in reserve, it seems we can truly say that there are those of them
that are non-self-members. Maybe the singularist replies that
some mystical censor stops us from quantifying over absolutely
everything without restriction.11
The object singularist might retort that the problem has little to do
with plurals. It already arises for singular languages with the usual
model-theoretic semantics, where domains are sets and thus we can
never interpret a sentence like (23) as talking about every set there is.
(23) Every set is self-identical.
The inability to capture models with domains too big to form a set—
the object singularist will conclude—should not cast doubt on object
singularism as a semantic view about plurals.
11. To which he adds: “Lo, he violates his own stricture in the very act of
proclaiming it!"
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The burden is now on the opponent of object singularism to argue
that, when plurals are introduced, the inability to capture models with
domains too big to form a set poses a special problem. A promising
way to do that is to reflect on a logical difference between standard se-
mantics for first-order languages and the object singularist’s semantics
for plurals.
A famous argument by Kreisel (1967) shows that, for a first-order
language, the semantic notion of consequence and the notion of prov-
ability coincide extensionally with the intuitive notion of consequence.
This turns essentially on the fact that there is a sound and complete
proof system for first-order logic relative to the usual model-theoretic
semantics. So, despite the fact that the semantics only appeals to mod-
els with set-sized domains, the resulting relation of semantic conse-
quence matches the intuitive relation of logical consequence. At least
in the first-order case, this should put to rest worries about the absence
of models with domains too big to form a set. For the purpose of giv-
ing an extensionally correct characterization of the notion of logical
consequence for a singular language, set-sized domains are enough.
Can the argument be extended to plurals?
It turns out that the relation of semantic consequence sanctioned by
object singularism is not compact.12 By a standard argument, it follows
that there is no effective proof system that is sound and complete for
the semantics sectioned by object singularism. So Kreisel’s argument is
12. Assuming standard rather than Henkin semantics, it can be shown that
there is an infinite set of sentences Γ and a sentence σ such that Γ  σ but
for no finite Γ0 ⊂ Γ, Γ0  σ. Following Yi 2006, here is a proof sketch. Fix
a binary predicate R. Let Γ be the set of sentences {R(cn, cn+1) : n ∈ ω},
where c0, . . . , cn, . . . are distinct singular constants. Then
Γ  ∃vv ∀v0(v0 ≺ vv→ ∃v1(v1 ≺ vv ∧ R(v0, v1)))
However, there is no finite subset Γ0 of Γ such that
Γ0  ∃vv ∀v0(v0 ≺ vv→ ∃v1(v1 ≺ vv ∧ R(v0, v1)))
not immediately available to the object singularist, and worries about
the inability to capture models with domains too big to form a set
cannot be easily put to rest.
Property singularism sidesteps this problem. In the context of prop-
erty singularism, (21) expresses the requirement that there be a prop-
erty instantiated by all the objects in the range of the first-order quan-
tifiers.
(21) ∃vv ∀v v ≺ vv
But the requirement is clearly met, as witnessed by any universal prop-
erty, say that of being self-identical. Thus accepting the possibility of
absolutely unrestricted quantification, or at least quantification over all
sets, gives us reasons to prefer property singularism over object singu-
larism.13
Let us now turn to pluralism. The pluralist who subscribes to the
plural conception takes plural terms to denote many things at once
and takes plural predicates to denote plural properties. Two versions
of this view were identified above, one takes properties to be objects,
while the other takes them to be predicable entities of a higher type
than objects.
There are at least two reasons to accept the second version of plu-
ralism and construe properties as typed. A Russell-style argument put
forth by Williamson (2003) shows that, if one accepts an intuitive re-
quirement on what semantic interpretations there are and admits the
possibility of absolutely unrestricted quantification, one cannot con-
strue semantic interpretations as objects. Williamson’s argument can
be extended to show that, as long as properties are taken to be objects,
one cannot construe semantic interpretations as pluralities either. But
13. There is controversy over whether absolutely unrestricted quantification is
possible (for arguments against the possibility of quantifying over absolutely
everything see, e.g., Glanzberg 2004, Fine 2006, Glanzberg 2006, Hellman 2006,
Parsons 2006, and Weir 2006). Since rejecting absolutely unrestricted quantifi-
cation would remove the main difficulty with object singularism, weakening
significantly the case for pluralism and for the plural conception of reality, I
will assume that absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible.
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this is the natural construal of the notion of an interpretation for the
untyped pluralist.14
There is also a cardinality problem. In particular, untyped plural-
ism runs against a plural version of Cantor’s Theorem. Speaking infor-
mally, if there is more than one object, there are more pluralities than
objects. Thus, if properties are objects, there are more pluralities than
properties. As a result, some intuitive interpretations of plural pred-
icates are unavailable to the untyped pluralist. The details of these
arguments against untyped pluralism are spelled out in Florio forth-
coming. The important point here is that typed pluralism escapes both
problems and thus appears to be the best pluralist option. Parallel ar-
guments show that the property singularist too must construe proper-
ties as typed. This means, among other things, that both typed plural-
ism and property singularism have to live with the familiar expressive
limitations associated with typed approaches. Notably, the notion of
property employed in the semantics cannot be expressed in the object
language.
To sum up, we have found reasons to reject two of the four com-
peting semantic accounts of plurals under consideration. If we want
to do justice to absolutely unrestricted quantification, or at least quan-
tification over all sets, there is pressure to reject object singularism.
Moreover, paradox and cardinality considerations undermine untyped
pluralism. This leaves us with two contenders, property singularism
and typed pluralism. In the next section, I will say more about them.
After that, I will argue that property singularism is in good standing,
defending it from a number of objections.
4. Property singularism and typed pluralism
Although it encompasses infinitely many types of entities, the hierar-
chical conception of reality underpinning the singularist semantics has
14. See McKay 2006, pp. 147-54, for a discussion of Williamson’s argument from
the perspective of untyped pluralism. Untyped pluralism construes semantic
interpretations as pluralities in the sense that semantic interpretations are given
by some things, i.e. ordered pairs coding the relevant semantic information.
a simple structure: there are objects at the bottom (entities of type 0),
then there are singular properties of objects (type 1), singular prop-
erties of singular properties of objects (type 2), and so on. Of course,
one must countenance relational properties as well as monadic ones.
This hierarchy corresponds to the hierarchy of type theory. Let us call
a property of type n an nth-order property. A superscript will indicate
the type of an entity in this hierarchy: objects will be indicated by the
superscript 0 (e.g. x0, y0, z0), first-order properties by the superscript 1
(e.g. x1, y1, z1), and second-order properties by the superscript 2 (e.g.
x2, y2, z2).
The hierarchy associated with the plural conception of reality and
underpinning typed pluralism is composed by the singular hierarchy
outlined just above plus plural properties (indicated here by Greek let-
ters: α, β, . . .), properties of plural properties, and so on. Fortunately,
the semantic views under discussion appeal only to entities of low
types. This is why we can avoid most issues concerning the exact con-
struction and extent of the hierarchies.15 However, some assumptions
should be mentioned.
First, we may assume that genuinely plural properties are found
only at the initial stage of the plural hierarchy. For our purposes, there
is no need to introduce higher-order plural properties, i.e. higher-order
properties instantiated jointly by many lower-level properties. Second,
it is convenient to assume that a property can only be instantiated by
(and can only relate) entities of lower types. But we do not require that
all of its arguments be exactly of the type immediately below. In other
words, we take the hierarchies to be cumulative. A related question
concerns which types of entity can occupy a particular argument place.
We call exclusivity the assumption that an argument place can be occu-
pied by entities of one type only. Properties that satisfy exclusivity will
be said to be exclusive, whereas properties that violate it will be said
to be flexible. If the regimenting language is augmented with flexible
15. The formal treatment in the Appendix makes clear which types of entities
are involved in the two semantics and which semantic function they serve.
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predicates (see section 2), flexible properties would naturally serve as
the semantic values of those predicates.
As noted above, typed pluralism and property singualrism agree
on the semantics for the singular fragment of the object language, tak-
ing a singular term to denote an object and a singular predicate to
denote a singular property. For the pluralist, plural terms denote plu-
ralities and plural predicates denote plural properties. For the property
singularist, plural terms denote singular first-order properties and plu-
ral predicates denote singular second-order properties. However, the
property singularist needs to impose two restrictions. The semantic
values of plural terms should be confined to non-empty properties and
those of plural predicates should be confined to second-order exten-
sional properties. A second-order property is extensional just in case, if
it is instantiated by a first-order property x1, it is instantiated by any
first-order property coextensive with x1.16 Without the extensionality
requirement (24) would be consistent.
(24) ∃vv1 (C(vv1) ∧ ∃vv2 (vv1 ≈ vv2 ∧ ¬C(vv2)))
But it should not be, since it regiments the following, inconsistent sen-
tence.
(25) There are some people who cooperate but who are the same as
some people who do not cooperate.
To illustrate the two semantics further, let us examine how they
specify the interpretation of a basic plural predication, such as ‘Plato
and Aristotle disagree’. This sentence can be regimented as (26).
(26) ∃vv (∀v (v ≺ vv↔ (v = p ∨ v = a)) ∧ D(vv))
I will use subscripts to indicate the relativization of a notion to a given
interpretation. For the typed pluralist, ‘Plato and Aristotle disagree’ is
16. It is worth remarking that a parallel restriction would have to be introduced
to extend the semantics to modal contexts. Following the majority view about
the modal behavior of plurals, the additional restriction would, not surpris-
ingly, confine the semantic values of plural terms to modally rigid properties.
true relative to a given interpretation I if and only if there are some
things xx in the domainI such that anything is one of them just in
case it is the denotationI of ‘Plato’ or the denotationI of ‘Aristotle’,
and those things jointly instantiate the plural property α denotedI by
‘disagree’, i.e. α(xx).
For the property singularist, ‘Plato and Aristotle disagree’ is true
relative to a given interpretation J if and only if there is a non-empty
property x1 such that x1 is instantiated by the denotationJ of ‘Plato’
and by the denotationJ of ‘Aristotle’ (and by no other thing), and x1
instantiates the second-order extensional property x2 denotedJ by ‘dis-
agree’, i.e. x2(x1).
Typed pluralism and property singularism characterize the notion
of truth relative to an interpretation differently. But do they sanction
different logics for plurals? The answer is negative: they are model-
theoretically equivalent. As proved in the Appendix, property singu-
larism yields the same relation of logical consequence for the regiment-
ing language as does typed pluralism. Property singularism relies on
resources that are deemed legitimate by the proponent of the plural
conception of reality, who countenances both singular and plural prop-
erties. The result then shows that plural resources are semantically dis-
pensable, even by the lights of the proponent of the plural conception.
If property singularism is in good standing, we should conclude that
the semantic challenge to the singular conception has been met.
5. Is property singularism in good standing?
The idea of using properties in connection with plurals is not new.
It may already be found in Russell, and it has been suggested re-
peatedly since then (see Russell 1919, 1938; Higginbotham and Schein
1989; Dummett 1991; and Lønning 1997). However, these proposals dif-
fer from property singularism in a critical way. They pursue forms
of Regimentation Singularism, employing the language of higher-
order logic in the regimentation. As a result, they face a number of
objections (see Yi 1999, 2005; Oliver and Smiley 2001, 2013). In con-
trast, property singularism rejects Regimentation Singularism and
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takes plural predication at face value. It invokes properties only in the
interpretation of the regimenting language.
Suppose that we had tried to use higher-order resources in the regi-
mentation, paraphrasing plural terms as higher-order ones. As pointed
out by Yi (1999, 2005), this would have had unpalatable consequences
for the theory of properties. Consider this valid inference:
(27)
Russell and Whitehead cooperate
Russell and Whitehead are the authors of Principia Mathematica
The authors of Principia Mathematica cooperate
According to the proposal under consideration, (27) would be regi-
mented along the lines of (28).
(28)
∃X(∀x (Xx ↔ (x = r ∨ x = w)) ∧ C(X))
∃X(∀Y (A(Y, p) ↔ Y = X) ∧ ∀x (Xx ↔ (x = r ∨ x = w)))
∃X(∀Y (A(Y, p)↔ Y = X) ∧ C(X))
But (28) is invalid. To be rendered valid it would have to be supple-
mented with the assumption that cooperating is an extensional second-
order property.
(29) ∀X ∀Y((C(X) ∧ ∀x (Xx ↔ Yx))→ C(Y))
Since the original inference is logically valid as it stands, i.e. without
additional premises, (29) must be taken to be a logical truth. That is,
one must assume that it is a matter of logic that cooperating is an ex-
tensional property. Parallel arguments involving other collective predi-
cates in the language show that the assumption must extend to a great
deal of plural properties. Yi concludes:
it is one thing to hold the extensional conception, quite another
to hold, more implausibly, that the truth of the conception rests
on logic alone. [. . . ] One cannot meet the objections [. . . ] under
the assumption that the property indicated by “COOPERATE” is
one that Russell calls extensional (that is, a second-order prop-
erty instantiated by any first-order property coextensive with
one that instantiates it). This does not help unless the assump-
tion holds by logic [. . . ]. (Yi 2005, p. 475; see also Yi 1999, p. 173)
Be that as it may, property singularism is immune from this diffi-
culty. As it would be easy to verify, property singularism validates (27)
without having to regard the argument as enthymematic. This turns
essentially on the extensionality requirement built into the semantics.
The requirement that plural predicates be interpreted by second-
order extensional properties salvages the validity of (27), but is it ac-
ceptable? The property singularist does not have to embrace an exten-
sional conception of properties, let alone embrace it as logically true.
On semantic grounds, he just has to confine the semantic values of
plural predicates to extensional properties. As it happens, there is no
shortage of such properties. It follows from the principle of second-
order comprehension that any second-order property can be extension-
alized. In symbols, for any z2:
(30) ∃x2 ∀y1 (x2(y1)↔ ∃z1(z2(z1) ∧ ∀x0(y1(x0)↔ z1(x0))))
So the problem is not whether extensional properties are available.
Rather, it is whether one may impose a restriction on the semantic val-
ues of plural predicates that excludes non-extensional properties. But
restrictions of this sort are ubiquitous in semantics and, as far as I can
see, there is nothing extraordinary about the one at hand.
Below I would like to discuss four possible objections to property
singularism. They concern respectively flexible predicates, the use of
properties as semantic values of plural terms, Boolos’s plural inter-
pretation of second-order logic, and the use of irrelevant entities in
semantics.
The first objection is based on some prima facie evidence for flexible
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predicates. Consider these two sentences:
(31) (a) Russell and Whitehead wrote a book.
(b) Wittgenstein wrote a book.
From them, it seems that one may infer (32).
(32) Russell and Whitehead wrote a book and Wittgenstein did too.
The possibility of coordination displayed in (32) gives some support to
the claim that the predicate ‘wrote a book’ occurs univocally in (31a)
and (31b) and thus should be assigned the same semantic value in both
sentences. It might be thought that this threatens the property singu-
larist, as he would interpret ‘wrote a book’ as a second-order property
in (31a) and as a first-order property in (31b). However, this would be
a problem only if it is assumed that all properties are exclusive.
Does the predicate occur univocally in (31a) and (31b)? A number
of other tests could be used to argue in favor of univocity. For example,
one can seemingly quantify over both predicates.
(33) Wittgenstein did something that Russell and Whitehead did.
Moreover, the predicate ‘wrote a book’ can be used with disjunctive
noun phrases with a plural and singular component, such as ‘two fa-
mous British logicians or Wittgenstein’:
(34) Two famous British logicians or Wittgenstein wrote a book.
Furthermore, both ‘Russell and Whitehead (did)’ and ‘Wittgenstein
(did)’ would be appropriate answers to the question: ‘Who wrote a
book?’.17
Trying to decide whether univocity holds, and thus whether the reg-
imenting language should encompass flexible predicates, would take
us too far afield. Fortunately, there is no need to resolve this issue here.
The important point is that univocity can be upheld simply by rejecting
17. Thanks to Ben Caplan and Alex Oliver here. For discussion, see Rumfitt
2005 as well as Oliver and Smiley 2013, chapter 4.
exclusivity and embracing flexible properties in the semantics. This is
quite natural for the typed pluralist who can imitate what happens at
the level of regimentation. But it is an option for the property singu-
larist too. He would have to allow for flexible second-order properties
that can take both objects and first-order properties as an argument.
Though this is not common in standard presentations of type theory, it
is consistent and it amounts to removing what Gödel has described as
a ‘superfluous restriction’ of type theory (Gödel 1933). An alternative,
less attractive response is of course to raise the type of singular terms
to match those of plural ones. In any case, flexible predicates cut no ice
in the dispute between the pluralist and the property singularist. For
simplicity, the technical result in the Appendix is formulated in and
for a language without flexible predicates, but I indicate how it can be
extended to a language that contains them.
Another objection to property singularism concerns the use of prop-
erties as semantic values of plural terms. One might think that this
commits the property singularist to the implausible view that if Rus-
sell and Whitehead wrote Principia, then a property wrote Principia. But
that would be mistaken: property singularism does not incur any con-
sequence of this sort. To begin with, the result proved in the Appendix
implies that the inference from ‘Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia’
to ‘a property wrote Principia’ is valid according to property singular-
ism if and only if it is valid according to typed pluralism. However,
it would be straightforward to verify that both semantics make the
inference invalid. Once the distinction between Semantic Singular-
ism and Regimentation Singularism has been properly recognized,
it should be easier to see why this objection fails. The central point is
that property singularism appeals to properties in the semantics, not
in the regimentation.
The third objection is based on Boolos’s plural interpretation of
monadic second-order logic. Boolos (1984, 1985) has famously pointed
out that monadic second-order logic can be interpreted in a fragment
of our plural regimenting language not involving plural predicates.
This might suggest that plural resources are prior or better understood
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than higher-order ones. From this perspective, property singularism
is wrong-headed, as it interprets plurals by means of higher-order re-
sources. However, there are obvious obstacles in extending Boolos’s re-
sults to full second-order logic or higher-order logics (see, e.g., Lewis
1991, Rayo and Yablo 2001). Moreover, if the regimenting language con-
tains collective plural predicates, the resort to higher-order resources
in the metalanguage is compelling (see Williamson 2003, Yi 2006, and
the discussion in section 3 above). This is acknowledged by the typed
pluralist who, like the property singularist, has to make use of such
resources in the semantics (see Florio forthcoming). So both the prop-
erty singularist and the typed pluralist have to forgo the benefits of
Boolos’s program.
The last objection I would like to address is the charge that property
singularism introduces irrelevant entities in the semantics. The mere
possibility of interpreting plural terms as standing for properties—the
objection goes—does not show that this is in fact how they should be
interpreted. Consider the parallel case of first-order languages. In light
of familiar metatheoretic results, we know that countable models suf-
fice to characterize the relation of first-order consequence. This means
that a semantics for such languages can assume that the quantifiers
range only over natural numbers. That is, from the semantic point of
view, ‘we can . . . think of all our objects as natural numbers’ (Quine
1968, p. 207): we can think of singular terms as standing for natural
numbers and we can think of predicates as standing for sets of natu-
ral numbers. Quine asked: ‘May we not thus settle for an all-purpose
Pythagorean ontology outright?’ Of course, the mere possibility of in-
terpreting the object language by means of entities of a certain kind
does not show that such entities encompass all there is. What this pos-
sibility does show, however, is that the introduction of entities of other
kinds cannot be justified on purely semantic grounds. Going back to
the case of plurals, the possibility of interpreting plural terms as singu-
lar properties (and plural predicates as second-order properties) shows
that semantics alone cannot sustain the plural conception of reality.
This shifts the debate to metaphysics.
It might be that there are strong metaphysical considerations in
favor of the plural conception. It seems to me, though, that there is
no clear basis for optimism. A proper discussion of the metaphysical
debate cannot be articulated here but, in closing, I would like to make
at least some brief general remarks. An important caveat has to do with
expressibility problems of the kind gestured at above. If quantification
over absolutely everything is possible, then there is pressure to assume
a type distinction between objects and properties. Properties and facts
become higher-order entities that can be expressed in the expanded
language used in the metatheory but not in the object language. That
means that ordinary talk about these metaphysical entities has to be
taken with a grain of salt, as it will ultimately have to be recast in
higher-order terms. This is the same grain of salt Frege was hoping his
reader would not begrudge.
Can the plural conception be vindicated on metaphysical grounds?
Since the singular conception is compatible with a wide array of views
about what reality is like, a metaphysical case for the plural concep-
tion requires the rejection of a number of alternative ways of specify-
ing what there ultimately is. A prime example is Lewis’s Humean Su-
pervenience (see Lewis 1986, pp. vii-xv, Lewis 1994, and Weatherson
forthcoming). On this view, all contingent facts can be characterized
in terms of the distribution of perfectly natural, intrinsic properties of
space-time points or occupants of points, where these properties are
all singular. If plural properties are absent from the characterization
of contingent facts, it is doubtful that they will have to be invoked in
the characterization of non-contingent facts. This indicates that the pro-
ponent of the plural conception cannot expect an easy victory on the
metaphysical front.
It should be stressed that accepting the particular reduction sug-
gested by Lewis’s Humean Supervience is not compulsory. To under-
mine the metaphysical case for the plural conception, it is enough that
there be one way of reducing plural properties and facts. In several
paradigm cases, it is relatively straightforward to see how the first step
of a reduction might go. For instance, the fact that the natural numbers
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are infinite could be reduced to the fact that the property of being a nat-
ural number is equinumerous with a proper subproperty of itself. The
fact that two lines are parallel could be reduced to the fact that their
distance is, in the appropriate sense, always the same. The fact that
two individuals are shipmates could be reduced to the fact that they
sail on the same boat. Other cases will no doubt prove more difficult,
but nothing indicates that any difficulty would be insurmountable and
that all reductionist strategies are bound to fail. In the end, the details
of the reductionist project will depend on one’s metaphysical outlook.
What is important to keep in mind, however, is that in carrying out the
reduction one does not seek to provide a singular paraphrase of plural
sentences. As we have seen, there is little hope for that. What one seeks
to do is to articulate a view of what reality is like in which plural prop-
erties play no fundamental role. Once this task is disentangled from
the other, the prospects of success will certainly look more favorable.
6. Conclusion
Semantic considerations about plurals offer an indispensability argu-
ment in favor of the plural conception of reality. Plurals do indeed
pose a semantic challenge for those who subscribe to the singular con-
ception of reality. Traditional responses to the challenge have relied on
Regimentation Singularism, which is problematic. However, adopt-
ing a regimenting language that distinguishes between syntactically
singular and syntactically plural expressions is compatible with the
view that the interpretations for this language can be specified ade-
quately within the boundaries of the singular conception.
Four competing semantic accounts of plurals were examined: object
singularism, property singularism, untyped pluralism, and typed plu-
ralism. If one admits the possibility of quantification over absolutely
everything, property singularism and typed pluralism appear to be
the most promising views. Typed pluralism invokes plural properties,
whereas property singularism does not. Nonetheless, as proved in the
Appendix, the two accounts are model-theoretically equivalent, deliv-
ering the same relation of logical consequence for the common regi-
menting language.
As I have argued, property singularism is in good standing as a se-
mantic account of plurals. Since it employs resources that are deemed
legitimate by those who embrace the plural conception, the equiva-
lence between property singularism and typed pluralism is significant.
It shows that, even by the lights of the proponent of the plural con-
ception, plural properties are semantically dispensable. Of course, this
does not exclude that there might be pressure in favor of the plural
conception arising from other domains and in particular from meta-
physics. Although this is doubtful, the point remains that the singular
conception of reality is rich enough to provide a viable semantics for
plurals. Semantic considerations alone do not give us reasons to aban-
don it.18
Appendix
After introducing some preliminary notions (Appendix A), I provide
a more rigorous presentation of typed pluralism (Appendix B1) and
property singularism (Appendix B2). Under minimal assumptions
about the relationship between pluralities and properties, I then prove
18. For helpful comments and discussion, I wish to thank Andrea Borghini, Ben
Caplan, Simon Hewitt, Keith Hossack, Øystein Linnebo, Tom McKay, David
Nicolas, Alex Oliver, Agustín Rayo, Marcus Rossberg, Ian Rumfitt, Richard
Samuels, David Sanson, Stewart Shapiro, Timothy Smiley, Florian Steinberger,
William Taschek, Neil Tennant, Gabriel Uzquiano, Sean Walsh, and two anony-
mous reviewers. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Sociedad
Argentina de Análisis Filosófico, The Ohio State University, Université de
Genève, Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, Univer-
sity of Oxford, and Birkbeck, University of London. I am grateful to the mem-
bers of the audiences for their valuable feedback. My research has been partly
funded by a European Research Council Starting Grant (2241098) with Øystein
Linnebo as principal investigator.
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that the two approaches yield the same relation of logical consequence
for the common regimenting language (Appendix C).
Appendix A: Preliminary notions
The notation for entities of various types was introduced in section 4.
Some abbreviations will be convenient:
x1 v y1 ↔de f ∀z0(x1(z0)→ y1(z0))
xx  x1 ↔de f ∀z0(z0 ≺ xx → x1(z0))
xx ≡ x1 ↔de f ∀z0(z0 ≺ xx ↔ x1(z0))
αon[m] x2 ↔de f ∀xx1, . . . , xxm ∀x11, . . . , x1m ∀x01, . . . , x0n−m
((α(xx1, . . . , xxm, x01, . . . , x
0
n−m) & xx1 ≡ x11 & . . . & xxm ≡ x1m)→
x2(x11, . . . , x
1
m, x
0
1, . . . , x
0
n−m))
αnn[m] x2 ↔de f ∀x11, . . . , x1m ∀xx1, . . . , xxm ∀x01, . . . , x0n−m
((x2(x11, . . . , x
1
m, x
0
1, . . . , x
0
n−m) & xx1 ≡ x11 & . . . & xxm ≡ x1m)→
α(xx1, . . . , xxm, x01, . . . , x
0
n−m))
α 1n[m] x2 ↔de f αon[m] x2 & αnn[m] x2
Let us define the basic semantic notions. First, we have relations of
interpretation (I) and variable assignment (A) between constants or
variables of the regimenting language and entities populating the uni-
verse of the metatheory. Since interpretations and assignments are
functional, we may use the square bracket notation JsKR to indicate the
unique entity or entities assigned to s by R. The typed pluralist and the
property singularist agree on the semantics of the singular fragment of
the language. They disagree on the semantics of the plural fragment.
So interpretations of singular constants (I0) and interpretations of sin-
gular predicates (I1), as well as assignments for singular variables (A0),
will be the same for both accounts. These semantic relations are char-
acterized by the following conditions on I0, I1, and A0, relative to a
domain of quantification given by a singular property d1.19
1. For any singular constant c, there is x0 such that JcKI0 = x0 and
d1(x0).
2. For any singular predicate S, there is x1 such that JSKI1 = x1 and,
for every z01, . . . , z
0
n, if x1(z01, . . . , z
0
n), then d1(z01), . . . , d
1(z0n).
3. For any singular variable v, there is x0 such that JvKA0 = x0 and
d1(x0). A variant A0(v/y0) of A0 with respect to v is defined in the
usual way.
According to typed pluralism, interpretations of plural predicates (I2)
assign a plural property to each plural predicate. Variable assignments
for plural variables (A1) assign some things in the domain to each
plural variable. That is, relative to a domain d1, we have the following
conditions on I2 and A1.
4. For any plural predicate Pn[m], there is α such that JPn[m]KI2 = α and,
for every zz1, . . . , zzm, z01, . . . , z
0
n−m, if α(zz1, . . . , zzm, z01, . . . , z
0
n−m),
then zz1  d1, . . . , zzm  d1 and d1(z01), . . . , d
1(z0n−m).
5. For any plural variable vv, there are xx such that JvvKA1 ≈ xx and
xx d1. A variant A1(vv/yy) of A1 with respect to vv is also defined
in the usual.
Next we have counterparts of these semantic relations for the prop-
erty singularist, i.e. interpretations of plural predicates (I∗2 ) assigning
19. For the typed pluralist, domains of quantifications are more naturally given
by some things, those constituting the domain. We could accommodate this op-
tion but defining domains in terms of singular properties simplifies the expo-
sition. That does not do violence to typed pluralism, since the typed pluralist
accepts the existence of singular properties.
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a second-order extensional property to each plural predicate, and vari-
able assignments for plural variables (A∗1) assigning a non-empty sin-
gular property to each plural variable.
4∗. For any plural predicate Pn[m], there is an extensional x2 such
that JPn[m]KI∗2 = x2 and, for every z11, . . . , z1m, z01, . . . , z0n−m, if
x2(z11, . . . , z
1
m, z01, . . . , z
0
n−m), then z11 v d1, . . . , z1m v d1 and
d1(z01), . . . , d
1(z0n−m).
5∗. For any plural variable vv, there is a non-empty x1 such thatJvvKA∗1 = x1 and x1 v d1. A variant A∗1(vv/y1) of A∗1 with respect
to vv must satisfy the condition that y1 be non-empty.
An additional abbreviation will be useful. For any singular term t,
JtKA0/I0 =
JtKA0 if t is a variable,JtKI0 if t is a constant.
We are now ready to formulate the two semantics.
Appendix B1: Typed pluralism
The notion of satisfaction according to the typed pluralist,
SatTP(ϕ, I0, I1, I2, A1, A2) (rewritten as I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1]), is im-
plicitly defined by the following clauses relative to interpretations and
assignments all defined on the same domain d1.
(i) If ϕ is of the form t = s, I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] if and only ifJtKA0/I0 = JsKA0/I0 .
(ii) If ϕ is of the form t ≺ vv, I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] if and onlyJtKA0/I0 ≺ JvvKA1 .
(iiia) If ϕ is of the form Sn(t1, . . . , tn), I0, I1, I2 TP Sn(t1, . . . , tn) [A0, A1]
if and only if JSnKI1(Jt1KA0/I0 , . . . , JtnKA0/I0).
(iiib) If ϕ is of the form Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvm, t1, . . . , tn−m),
I0, I1, I2 TP Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvm, t1, . . . , tn−m) [A0, A1] if and only ifJPn[m]KI2(Jvv1KA1 , . . . , JvvmKA1 , Jt1KA0/I0 , . . . , Jtn−mKA0/I0).
(iv) If ϕ is of the form ∃v ψ, I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] if and only if, for
some x0 such that d1(x0), I0, I1, I2 TP ψ [A0(v/x0), A1].
(v) If ϕ is of the form ∃vv ψ, I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] if and only if, for
some xx such that xx  d1, I0, I1, I2 TP ψ [A0, A1(vv/xx)].
(vi-xi) The clauses for negation and for the binary connectives are the ob-
vious ones.
The last step is to characterize the notions of logical consequence
and logical truth. For any set of sentences Γ and any sentence
σ, σ is a logical consequence of Γ according to typed pluralism
(Γ TP σ) just in case for any interpretations I0, I1, I2 and assignments
A0, A1, if I0, I1, I2 TP γ [A0, A1] for any member γ of Γ, then
I0, I1, I2 TP σ [A0, A1].
Appendix B2: Property singularism
The notion of satisfaction according to the property singularist,
SatPS(ϕ, I0, I1, I∗2 , A1, A∗2) (rewritten as I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ]), is also
given an implicit definition with respect to interpretations and assig-
ments defined on the same domain d1. The satisfaction clauses for the
singular fragment of the language are the same as those of typed plu-
ralism. The clauses for the plural fragment of the language are as fol-
lows.
(ii∗) If ϕ is of the form t ≺ vv, I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ] if and only ifJvvKA∗1 (JtKA0/I0).
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(iiib∗) If ϕ is of the form Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvn, t1, . . . , tn−m),
I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ] if and only ifJPn[m]KI2(Jvv1KA∗1 , . . . , JvvmKA∗1 , Jt1KA0/I0 , . . . , Jtn−mKA0/I0).
(v∗) If ϕ is ∃vv ψ, I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ] if and only if, for some non-
empty x1 such that x1 v d1, I0, I1, I∗2 PS ψ [A0, A∗1(vv/x1)].
The notions of logical consequence (Γ PS σ) and logical truth accord-
ing to property singularism are then characterized in the obvious way
by quantifying over interpretations.
Appendix C: The equivalence
For any two interpretations I2 and I∗2 and for any two assignments A1
and A∗1 all defined on the same domain, the notation R(I2, I
∗
2 ; A1, A
∗
1)
will abbreviate the following: for any plural predicate of the language
Pn[m], JPn[m]KI2 1n[m] JPn[m]KI∗2 and, for any plural variable vv, JvvKA1 ≡JvvKA∗1 .
Here are the assumptions used to prove the main result below. They
sanction a correspondence in extension between pluralities and non-
empty singular first-order properties, and between plural properties
and singular second-order ones.
(1) ∀xx ∃x1 xx ≡ x1
(2) ∀x1(∃x0 x1(x0)→ ∃xx xx ≡ x1)
(3) For every n, m such that n ≥ m ≥ 1, ∀α ∃x2 αon[m] x2
(4) For every n, m such that n ≥ m ≥ 1, ∀x2 ∃α αnn[m] x2
These assumptions are certainly problematic if properties are con-
strued as objects. In that case, a plural version of Cantor’s Theorem
would bar the assumptions. But once properties are typed, the obsta-
cle is removed.
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ, interpretations I2 and I∗2 , and assignments
A1 and A∗1 , if R(I2, I
∗
2 ; A1, A
∗
1), then for every I0, I1 and A0,
I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] if and only if I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ].
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is singular, the claim
is trivial. If ϕ is of the form t ≺ vv, then:
I0, I1, I2 TP ϕ [A0, A1] ⇔JtKA0/I0 ≺ JvvKA1 ⇔ (since R(I2, I∗2 ; A1, A∗1), JvvKA1 ≡ JvvKA∗1 )JvvKA∗1 (JtKA0/I0) ⇔
I0, I1, I∗2 PS ϕ [A0, A∗1 ]
If ϕ is of the form Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvm, t1, . . . , tn−m), then:
I0, I1, I2 TP Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvm, t1, . . . , tn−m) [A0, A1] ⇔JPn[m]KI2(Jvv1KA1 , . . . , JvvmKA1 , Jt1KA0/I0 , . . . , Jtn−mKA0/I0) ⇔
(since R(I2, I∗2 ; A1, A∗1), JvviKA1 ≡ JvviKA∗1 and JPn[m]KI2 1n[m] JPn[m]KI∗2 )JPn[m]KI∗2 (Jvv1KA∗1 , . . . , JvvmKA∗1 , Jt1KA0/I0 , . . . , Jtn−mKA0/I0) ⇔
I0, I1, I∗2 PS Pn[m](vv1, . . . , vvm, t1, . . . , tn−m) [A0, A∗1 ]
Finally, if ϕ is of the form ∃vv ψ and the claim holds for ψ, then:
I0, I1, I2 TP ∃vv ψ [A0, A1] ⇔
for some xx  d1, I0, I1, I2 TP ψ [A0, A1(vv/xx)] ⇔
(by (1) and (2))
for some non-empty x1 v d1, I0, I1, I∗2 PS ψ [A0, A∗1(vv/x1)] ⇔
I0, I1, I∗2 PS ∃vv ψ [A0, A∗1 ]
The other clauses are straightforward. So this completes the induction.
On the basis of (1)–(4), the following is clear.
Lemma 2. For any I2 and A1 defined on the same domain, there are I∗2 and
A∗1 such that R(I2, I
∗
2 ; A1, A
∗
1). Conversely, for any I
∗
2 and A
∗
1 defined on the
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same domain, there are I2 and A1 such that R(I2, I∗2 ; A1, A∗1).
Now we can prove the result we are after.
Proposition. For any sentence σ and any set of sentences Γ,
Γ TP σ if and only if Γ PS σ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ TP σ. We want to show that Γ PS σ. Let
I0, I1, I∗2 , A0, A∗1 be arbitrary interpretations and assignments such
that I0, I1, I∗2 PS γ [A0, A∗1 ] for every member γ of Γ. By Lemma
2, R(I2, I∗2 ; A1, A∗1) for some I2 and A1. By Lemma 1, I0, I1, I2 TP
γ [A0, A1] for every member γ of Γ. But Γ TP σ, hence I0, I1, I2 TP
σ [A0, A1]. Therefore, by Lemma 1 again, I0, I1, I∗2 PS σ [A0, A∗1 ]. Since
I0, I1, I∗2 , A0, A∗1 are arbitrary, Γ PS σ. The other direction is proved
similarly.
A final point: the main result has been formulated for a regimenting
language without flexible predicates, but it can be extended to a lan-
guage that contains them. The details would be vexing, so I will just
state the assumptions needed to prove the result for a language with
monadic flexible predicates. In parallel with (3) and (4) above, we need
to assume a correspondence between flexible plural properties and flex-
ible singular ones, i.e.
(3∗) ∀α ∃x2 ∀xx ∀x1 ∀x0((α(xx) &xx ≡ x1 → x2(x1)) &
(α(x0) → x2(x0)))
(4∗) ∀x2 ∃α ∀xx ∀x1 ∀x0((x2(x1) & xx ≡ x1 → α(xx)) &
(x2(x0) → α(x0)))
The polyadic case is a straightforward extension of the monadic one.
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